Oil and Gas News and Energy — Monday, January 19, 2026: New Wave of Sanction Pressure, Oil Glut, and Record LNG Imports. Oil, Gas, Electricity, Renewable Energy, Coal, Oil Products, Refineries — Key Trends in the Global Fuel and Energy Complex for Investors and Market Participants.
The beginning of 2026 is marked by a continuation of geopolitical confrontation and a significant restructuring of global energy resource flows, attracting the attention of investors and market participants. Western countries maintain strong sanction pressure on Russia: the European Union is preparing a new package of energy-related restrictions, aiming to completely abandon Russian oil and gas. At the same time, the global oil market continues to experience a supply glut — slow demand growth and the return of some producers (for example, the gradual restoration of production in Iran and Venezuela) are keeping Brent prices around $60 per barrel. The European gas market is withstanding the winter consumption peak thanks to record LNG imports and supply diversification (including new volumes of gas from Azerbaijan), allowing prices to be restrained even with a reduction in Russian pipeline exports. The global energy transition is gaining momentum: record renewable energy capacities were introduced in 2025, although traditional resources remain essential for the reliable operation of energy systems. In Asia, demand for coal and hydrocarbons remains high, supporting the global commodity market, while in Russia, after last year's spike in gasoline prices, authorities are extending emergency export restrictions on oil products to maintain stability in the domestic fuel market. Below is a detailed overview of key events and trends in the oil, gas, energy, and commodity sectors as of this date.
Oil Market: Supply Glut Limits Price Growth
Global oil prices at the beginning of 2026 are kept at a moderate level due to the ongoing supply glut. The benchmark Brent blend is trading around $60–65 per barrel, while American WTI is in the $55–60 range. These price levels are approximately 10–15% lower than a year ago, reflecting a gradual correction following the energy crisis peaks of 2022-2023. The market shows a surplus of about 2–2.5 million barrels per day, as OPEC+ countries increased production in the second half of 2025 to regain lost market shares. The U.S. also augmented supply (shale oil production remains high), while some volumes from previously sanctioned countries have partially returned — Iran and Venezuela have noted an increase in export options after the easing of some restrictions. Meanwhile, global demand growth remains restrained: the slowdown in China's economy and the effects of energy conservation after a period of high prices limit the growth in oil consumption. Analysts estimate that without a significant rebound in demand or new actions from producers, prices could drop to $55 per barrel in the first half of 2026. A key factor will be OPEC+ policy: if the alliance does not decide to cut production and continues on its current path, prices will remain under pressure. Leading exporters are unlikely to allow a catastrophic market collapse and may again limit supply if necessary to support prices. Geopolitical risks are also present but have not yet led to supply disruptions: recent easing tensions in the Middle East quickly removed the “premium” from prices, and oil quotes soon returned to previous levels. Thus, the oil market is entering a situation close to equilibrium, although the balance is tilted in favor of buyers — excess supply and moderate demand prevent substantial price increases.
Gas Market: Winter, LNG, and New Routes Replace Russian Supplies
The European gas market entered 2026 under radically new conditions — nearly devoid of pipeline gas from Russia. As of January 1, the EU ban on most such supplies took effect, and Europe had proactively prepared for this step. EU countries filled underground gas storage (UGS) facilities to over 90% by the beginning of winter; by mid-January, stocks had been reduced to around 55-60% of capacity, still above average levels of previous years. Despite severe cold weather, gas withdrawals from UGS facilities have proceeded in a planned manner, without panic, and exchange prices remain several times lower than the peaks of 2022.
The main reason for this stability is record LNG imports. European LNG terminals in January are operating at maximum capacity: daily regasification volumes exceed 480 million cubic meters, surpassing previous historical records. This influx of LNG compensates for the cessation of Russian transit and keeps gas prices in check. Although spot prices in Europe have risen by 30-40% since the beginning of the month due to the cold, they are still far from the extreme energy-deficit levels of 2022. To satisfy demand under limited supplies from Russia, Europeans rely on several directions:
- maximal increase in pipeline gas supplies from Norway and North Africa;
- boosting LNG imports from the U.S., Qatar, and other countries;
- expanding the use of the Southern Gas Corridor (supplies from Azerbaijan to EU countries);
- reducing domestic consumption through energy-saving measures and increasing energy efficiency.
The combination of these measures allows Europe to relatively confidently navigate the current heating season even without Russian gas. Moreover, Russia is redirecting its exports East: in January, Gazprom reported record daily volumes of gas supplies to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline. As for the global market, seasonal demand increases are also being felt in Asia: key importers in Northeast Asia are boosting LNG purchases, and the Asian JKM index has risen to ~$10 per MMBtu (a maximum over the past month and a half). Nevertheless, the global gas balance remains stable: flexible redistribution of flows between regions and increased production (including in the U.S., where Henry Hub prices are hovering around $3 per MMBtu) allow for rising demand coverage. In the coming weeks, the situation in the gas market will largely depend on the weather: even if the cold persists, Europe has sufficient gas reserves and import capabilities to avoid a supply crisis.
International Politics: Sanctions, New Deals, and Redistribution of Flows
The sanction confrontation between Moscow and the West continues to develop in 2026. At the end of 2025, the EU approved its 19th package of measures, a significant portion of which targeted the Russian energy sector — including a decision to lower the price ceiling on Russian oil starting February 2026 and accelerate the abandonment of LNG imports from Russia (a ban on purchases starting in 2027). At the beginning of 2026, Brussels announced preparation for another step: it plans to legislatively ban the remaining volumes of Russian oil imports to EU countries, as well as implement the agreed-upon cessation of purchases of Russian pipeline gas. Simultaneously, the United States and the EU are tightening control over compliance with existing restrictions: last fall, the U.S. Treasury imposed additional sanctions against the oil companies "Rosneft" and "Lukoil," while European authorities are increasing oversight of the tanker fleet transporting Russian oil to circumvent established rules. Russia, for its part, has extended the ban on oil sales to countries participating in the price ceiling until June 30, 2026.
Nevertheless, the export of Russian oil and oil products is being maintained at a relatively high level due to the redirection of flows to Asia. China, India, Turkey, and several other countries continue to purchase Russian hydrocarbons at a significant discount to world prices. As a result, the global energy market is essentially divided into two parallel tracks: a "western" one, where sanctions and restrictions apply, and an alternative one, where Russian raw materials find demand, albeit at reduced prices. Investors and traders are closely monitoring sanction policies, as any changes affect logistics and price dynamics in the markets.
At the same time, the sanctions strategy of the West has shown elements of flexibility concerning certain countries. As political changes unfold in Caracas, the U.S. signals its readiness to expedite the lifting of oil sanctions against Venezuela. International companies have already received expanded licenses to operate in Venezuela: in the coming months, Chevron and other operators will significantly increase Venezuelan oil exports. In addition, Venezuela has signed a contract for natural gas exports for the first time in its history, opening a new chapter for its energy sector. Experts note that the restoration of Venezuela's oil and gas sector will be gradual — years of inadequate investment and sanctions have severely curtailed its production capabilities. However, the very fact of returning additional volumes to the market reinforces consumer confidence and exerts downward pressure on price growth expectations. Moreover, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have noticeably decreased: by mid-January, unrest in Iran subsided, and Washington's tough rhetoric regarding potential strikes against Iran has softened. As a result, the risks of sudden disruptions in Middle Eastern oil supply have temporarily decreased. Thus, the beginning of 2026 is characterized by a contradictory influence of politics on energy markets: on the one hand, sanction pressure on Russia remains high, while on the other, localized de-escalation in certain regions and targeted easing of restrictions (as with Venezuela) create a more favorable backdrop than previously anticipated.
Asia: India and China Navigate Between Imports and Production Development
- India: Despite pressure from Western partners to reduce cooperation with sanctioned suppliers, New Delhi has only moderately decreased its purchases of Russian oil and gas in recent months. A complete abandonment of these resources is considered impossible given their key role in national energy security. The country continues to receive raw materials from Russian companies at preferential terms: the discount on Urals oil for Indian buyers is about $4–5 below Brent prices, making these supplies quite attractive. As a result, India remains one of the largest importers of Russian oil while also increasing oil products purchases (for example, diesel fuel) to satisfy growing domestic demand. Concurrently, the Indian government is intensifying efforts to reduce future import dependence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced a large-scale program for exploring deep-water oil and gas fields on the shelf. The state company ONGC is already drilling ultra-deep wells in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea; initial results are considered promising. This initiative aims to discover new large hydrocarbon reserves and move India closer to its long-term goal of energy self-sufficiency.
- China: The largest economy in Asia continues to increase energy consumption, combining import growth with rising domestic production. Beijing has not joined the Western sanctions against Moscow and has leveraged the situation to increase its purchases of Russian energy resources under favorable terms. Analysts estimate that in 2025, China’s imports of oil and gas grew by 2–5% compared to the previous year, exceeding 210 million tons of oil and 250 billion cubic meters of gas, respectively. Growth rates have slowed somewhat relative to the spike in 2024 but remain positive. At the same time, China is setting records in domestic production: in 2025, national companies extracted over 200 million tons of oil and around 220 billion cubic meters of natural gas, which is 1–6% more than levels a year ago. The state actively invests in developing hard-to-access fields, implementing new technologies, and increasing the oil yield of mature deposits. Nevertheless, given the scale of the Chinese economy, dependence on imports remains significant: about 70% of the oil consumed and about 40% of the gas are still imported. In the coming years, these proportions are unlikely to change significantly. Thus, the two largest Asian consumers — India and China — continue to play a crucial role in global commodity markets, navigating between the need to import large volumes of fuel and the desire to develop their own resource base.
Energy Transition: Renewable Energy Records and the Significance of Traditional Generation
The global shift to clean energy reached new heights in 2025, establishing important benchmarks for the industry. Many countries rolled out record capacities of solar and wind generation, resulting in historical maximums of electricity generation from renewable sources. In the European Union, by the end of the year, the total generation from solar and wind plants surpassed that from coal and gas-fired power plants for the first time, solidifying the balance shift towards “green” energy. In such countries as Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and others, the share of renewable energy in electricity consumption consistently exceeded 50% on certain days due to the introduction of new capacities. In the U.S., renewable energy also hit a record level: at the start of 2025, more than 30% of all generation came from renewables, and the total volume of electricity generated by wind and solar surpassed that produced by coal-fired power plants. China remains the global leader in the scale of “green” construction — in 2025, the country introduced dozens of gigawatts of new solar panels and wind installations, continually setting new records for clean energy production. As these trends continue, leading oil, gas, and utility corporations are diversifying their business accordingly: significant investments are being directed towards renewable energy projects, hydrogen technology development, and energy storage systems.
However, the impressive progress in clean energy demands a balance with traditional generation. The past year has shown that during peak demand periods or adverse weather conditions (for example, in winter during lulls in wind and poor solar generation), reserve capacities based on fossil fuels remain critically important for ensuring reliable power supply. In Europe, which has significantly reduced its coal share in recent years, some coal plants had to be brought back online during severe cold spells, and gas-fired generation has taken on increased loads during periods of insufficient wind generation. In Asian countries, maintaining base coal generation secures the energy system against outages during spikes in consumption. As a result, while the world is rapidly moving towards cleaner energy, it is still far from full carbon neutrality. The transitional period is characterized by the coexistence of two models — rapidly growing renewable and traditional thermal, which serves as a buffer to smooth seasonal and weather fluctuations. Many countries' strategies involve parallel development of renewables and modernization of traditional infrastructure, aiming to ensure the resilience of energy systems on the path to a low-carbon future.
Coal: Asian Demand Keeps the Market at a High Level
Despite the efforts toward decarbonization, the global coal market continues to be characterized by significant consumption volumes and relatively stable prices. Demand for coal remains high, especially in Asian countries. In China and India — the two largest consumers — this resource still plays a key role in electricity generation and metallurgy. According to industry reports, global coal consumption in 2025 remained near historic highs, decreasing only by 1–2% compared to the record levels of 2024. The growth of coal use in developing economies compensates for its declining share in the energy balance of Europe and North America. Many Asian countries continue to launch new high-efficiency coal-fired power plants to meet the growing electricity demand of the population and industry.
The price situation in the coal market is currently more stable than during the peak of the energy crisis: at the beginning of 2026, energy coal prices are around $100–110 per ton, significantly below the highs two years ago. Price relief is supported by increased supply — leading exporters (Indonesia, Australia, South Africa, Russia, etc.) have ramped up production and exports, while consumption in Europe decreases as renewable energy develops and nuclear generation returns to operation. Europe is continuing its planned phase-out of coal: a significant event was the closure of the last deep coal mine in the Czech Republic in January, marking the end of 250 years of coal mining in the country. However, on a global level, coal remains an important component of the energy balance. The International Energy Agency forecasts that in the coming years, global coal demand will plateau and gradually decline. In the long term, stricter environmental policies and competition from cheaper renewable sources will limit the development of the coal sector, but in the short term, the coal market will continue to rely on consistently high Asian demand.
Russian Market: Export Restrictions and Stabilization of Fuel Prices
Unprecedented measures continue to be implemented in Russia's internal fuel and energy complex to normalize the price situation. After wholesale prices for gasoline and diesel surged to record levels in August 2025, the Russian government imposed a temporary ban on the export of key types of oil products. These restrictions have been repeatedly extended and remain in effect at least until February 28, 2026, covering the export of gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, and gas oils. The cessation of exports allowed significant volumes of fuel to be redirected to the domestic market, which noticeably reduced exchange prices by winter. Wholesale fuel prices retreated by tens of percent from peak levels, and the growth of retail prices at gas stations slowed down — by the end of the year, it was about 5%, fitting within the overall inflation framework. Thus, the fuel crisis has largely been mitigated: there is no gasoline shortage at gas stations, panic buying has subsided, and prices for end consumers have stabilized.
However, the cost of these measures has been a decrease in export revenue for oil companies and the budget. Russian oil producers are forced to accept lost profits to saturate the domestic market. Authorities claim that the situation is under control: the cost of oil production at most fields in Russia is low, so even at Urals prices below $40 per barrel, major projects remain profitable. Nevertheless, the decline in export revenue — by the end of 2025, oil and gas revenues to the Russian budget fell by about a quarter compared to the previous year — poses risks for launching new investment projects that require higher world prices and access to foreign markets. The state does not directly compensate companies but continues the operation of a damping mechanism (reverse excise) partially reimbursing lost revenues from the domestic sale of fuel.
The Russian fuel and energy complex is adjusting to the new conditions of the sanctions era. The main task for 2026 is to maintain a balance between holding back internal energy prices and preserving export revenues, which are vital for replenishing the budget and financing industry developments. The government emphasizes that it is prepared to extend restrictions on oil product exports or introduce new tools, if necessary, to prevent shortages and price shocks for the population. Simultaneously, measures are being developed to stimulate processing and seek new markets for raw material sales. So far, the adopted measures allow for stable fuel supply within the country and keep prices at a consumer-acceptable level. Monitoring the situation in the fuel sector remains a priority of state policy, as it is crucial for socio-economic stability and the resilience of Russia's oil and gas complex amid external pressures.
