The 21st EU sanctions package against Russia will impact the infrastructure for hydrocarbon exports: LNG tankers, the shadow fleet, and oil ports. RBK investigated the challenges that Brussels' actions will pose for the oil and logistics business.
The European Commission (EC) has announced the 21st sanctions package against Russia, with a statement published on the organization's official website. The restrictions will affect Russian banks, the defense industry, and will also impose a travel ban to the EU for Russian military personnel.
The EC also announced new sanctions targeting the Russian shadow fleet: 30 new vessels will be added to the existing list of 632 vessels already under sanction, the names of which have not been disclosed.
For the first time, restrictions will be imposed on vessels providing services to the Russian shadow fleet, including bunkering services. Additionally, limitations may be placed on ports and airports involved in the sale of Russian oil, as well as refineries utilizing Russian raw materials. Finally, the sale of LNG tankers to Russia will be restricted.
Restrictions on LNG Carriers
Countries in the EU have never sold tankers for transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Russia. For NOVATEK's export projects — "Yamal LNG" and "Arctic LNG-2" — ships built in South Korea are utilized. One LNG carrier for the "Arctic LNG-2" project, the "Alexey Kosygin," was constructed and delivered to the customer by the Russian shipyard SSK "Zvezda" at the end of 2025.
Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of the fuel marketplace Open Oil Market, reminded that most tankers for "Yamal LNG" were produced by South Korea's Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). "It is possible that the EU attempted to retroactively close a loophole that formally remained in the legislation. Although such a loophole would have been difficult to exploit, given the overall sanction backdrop," he said.
The Center for Price Indices (CPI) noted that there are no shipyards in the EU for constructing tankers, but there are ship repair yards for servicing them, particularly in Denmark. "It is possible that the sanctions will specifically include servicing and repairing Russian LNG tankers," they speculated. The CPI believes that with the new measures, the EU aims to "pressure" all consumers of Russian oil, including major buyers like China, India, and Turkey.
Dmitry Kasatkin, managing partner at Kasatkin Consulting, stated that the main risks related to LNG do not primarily concern the direct supply of new vessels from Europe but rather the services for the existing fleet — maintenance, insurance, and servicing of the vessels. "For operational LNG projects, there will be no effect if the sanctions do not affect ongoing long-term contracts and vessel servicing. This measure may be more sensitive for new Arctic LNG projects, as specialized ice-class LNG carriers are hard to replace: this fleet is expensive, scarce, and technologically complex. However, this will more likely complicate supply chains rather than result in an inability to purchase an LNG carrier," he argued.
Konstantin Pozdnyakov, advisor to the rector of RGSU and Doctor of Economics, mentioned that restrictions on the supply of LNG carriers will include a ban on the technical maintenance of Russian vessels for transporting liquefied gas. Furthermore, beginning in January 2027, it will become illegal to provide terminal services for Russian LNG, creating difficulties for European ship repair companies and terminal operators. He notes that the companies providing auxiliary services to the shadow fleet (primarily bunkering vessels for refueling ships at sea) and operators of technical support vessels will be particularly vulnerable to these changes. For shipowners, this represents a significant increase in compliance risks, as even a one-time provision of services to a tanker from the shadow fleet may lead to inclusion in sanctions lists and loss of access to European ports and financial services, according to the expert.
The Shadow Fleet and Foreign Ports
Kasatkin believes that the impact on Russian service vessels working with the shadow fleet will be limited. For shipowners, there will be increased risks, higher insurance costs, and complexities with chartering, repairs, and port entrances. However, the existing logistics are not critically affected: supply chains may be restructured through other jurisdictions and service points.
Tereshkin stated that sanctions against companies servicing the shadow fleet could theoretically complicate the logistics of oil exports temporarily. However, this will not have a long-term impact due to the regular re-registration of shadow fleet vessels and the release of a portion of tankers following a sudden easing of sanctions against Venezuela.
Commenting on potential sanctions against foreign maritime ports, Kasatkin noted that Russian oil and petroleum products are mainly exported through East Asian and Middle Eastern infrastructures: the ports of West India, China’s oil terminals in Shandong province and the eastern coast, Turkish ports and refineries, as well as certain transshipment and blending hubs used for mixing grades in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Pozdnyakov indicated that the primary recipients of Russian oil in 2024–2026 following the introduction of the European embargo will be India and China. "The main discharge ports will be Indian Jamnagar and Vadinar, as well as Chinese terminals servicing independent refineries," the expert explained.
Sanctions against ports and refineries working with Russian raw materials could theoretically affect the largest enterprises in India and Turkey, but the EU lacks direct leverage over the infrastructure of third countries," notes Pozdnyakov. "New restrictions may create additional compliance risks for such facilities, but are unlikely to halt supply," added Kasatkin. "These measures are not aimed directly at the end consumer of Russian oil, and the further the sanctions restrictions are from the end consumer, the less transparent the chain becomes, and the easier it is to restructure." The impact on airports is likely to be nonexistent, he pointed out. "A separate question is how these restrictions will be enforced and monitored. We assume that for the EU, Asian markets are opaque and the enforcement of sanctions will be quite formal," Kasatkin added.
Tereshkin believes that the new sanctions could be sensitive for Turkish refineries that use Russian oil to produce petroleum products for further supplies to Europe. "The European Union has already imposed restrictions on the import of petroleum products produced using Russian oil. However, it is quite difficult to trace such a ban, leading to new restrictions being introduced that will raise risks for refineries working with Russian raw materials," he clarified.
"Indian and Turkish refineries will face a choice between maintaining access to the European market and continuing to purchase discounted Russian raw materials," Pozdnyakov explained. "Many may prefer to redirect export flows to the growing Asian market. The long-term consequences will depend on the coordination of actions between the EU, the US, and the UK." According to him, the new sanctions imply an increase in logistics costs for Russian exports and the need to develop maritime transportation infrastructure without European contractors.
Source:
RBK
