Current Global News in the Oil, Gas, and Energy Sector as of February 12, 2026: Brent and WTI Oil, Natural Gas, LNG, Refineries, Electricity, Renewables, Coal, and Key Events in the Global Energy Market for Investors and Companies.
The global fuel and energy complex enters mid-February 2026 in a state of fragile balance amid conflicting signals. Potential dialogue between Washington and Tehran regarding the nuclear program has somewhat eased geopolitical tensions and supported calmer oil prices; however, concerns about market oversupply persist. The European gas market is experiencing noticeable volatility due to low inventory levels and weather factors, although active LNG imports and diversification of sources are currently containing the crisis. At the same time, the energy transition is gaining traction: renewable energy is setting records for capacity additions, while global coal demand is at a historic peak. Below is a detailed overview of key news and trends in the oil and gas sector and energy as of the current date.
Global Oil Market: Surplus Supply and Relative Price Stability
The oil market began 2026 showing signs of significant supply surplus. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), an oil surplus of up to 4 million barrels per day (approximately 4% of global demand) is expected in the first quarter. Overall production is outpacing consumption: OPEC+ countries increased quotas in the second half of 2025, while exports from the US, Brazil, Guyana, and other producers have also increased. This may lead to a rise in global inventories and exert downward pressure on prices.
Nevertheless, oil prices remain at moderate levels for the time being. Since the beginning of the year, Brent prices have increased by approximately 5%, partially driven by geopolitical expectations, currently trading within a range of $60–65 per barrel (WTI around $55–60). These levels are close to the end of 2025. The market is being supported from a sharper decline by several risk factors that contribute to a "geopolitical premium" in pricing:
- Venezuela: In early January, the US initiated steps to remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from power, urging oil companies to invest in the country's extraction sector. This prompted temporary disruptions in Venezuelan oil exports (January deliveries decreased by approximately 500,000 barrels per day), supporting prices for heavy crude.
- Iran: Prior to the recent announcement regarding negotiations, there were concerns about military strikes on Iran's oil infrastructure. Although the willingness of the US and Iran to engage in dialogue (negotiations occurred on February 6 in Oman) has partly eased tensions, the situation surrounding Iran remains an uncertainty factor, and traders are incorporating premiums in case of diplomatic breakdowns or escalations in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Production Disruptions: In Kazakhstan, unexpected production cuts occurred at the beginning of the year due to technical problems and drone attacks on fields. While the volumes of these losses are relatively small, such incidents highlight the fragility of supply and add caution to the market.
To maintain balance, exporters are adopting a measured strategy. The OPEC+ cartel and its allies (including Russia) have decided to pause after a series of production increases: current production quotas are maintained without increases at least until the end of March 2026. Major producers are striving to prevent market oversupply, noting that fundamental indicators remain relatively healthy, and commercial oil inventories are at moderate levels. OPEC+ states its preparedness to adjust production quickly in response to changing conditions: both to increase supplies (by restoring previously reduced volumes of 1.65 million barrels per day) and to cut back again if needed. Meanwhile, oil demand is slowly growing: the forecast for global consumption growth in 2026 is about +0.9–1.0 million barrels per day, mainly due to economic normalization and lower prices compared to the previous year. Overall, the oil market enters 2026 in a state of fragile equilibrium: the expected supply surplus is tempered by OPEC+'s cautious policy and the risks of disruptions, keeping prices within a relatively narrow range.
Natural Gas Market: European Volatility Amid Low Inventories
The global gas market at the beginning of 2026 is characterized by substantial price fluctuations, particularly in Europe. The calm of autumn—when gas exchange prices were stable within a narrow range (€28–30 per MWh at the TTF hub)—was disrupted by a spike in volatility in January. In the initial weeks of the new year, EU prices surged sharply, peaking at around €37 per MWh by January 16. The causes include a combination of weather and structural factors: the expectation of severe frost at the end of January raised demand, while gas inventories in storage were significantly lower than usual. By mid-January, underground gas storage (UGS) in Europe was only about half full (~50% of total capacity versus ~62% a year earlier and ~67% on average over the past five years for this date). This represents the lowest inventory levels in recent years (since the crisis winter of 2021/22), causing markets to worry about potential fuel shortages by the end of winter amidst insufficient imports.
Additional pressure on prices has come from disruptions in LNG supplies from the US at the beginning of the year—triggered by temporary technical issues and weather conditions at export terminals. Concurrently, demand for LNG in Asia surged due to colder weather, intensifying competition for spot fuel cargoes. Collectively, these factors led traders to rapidly close short positions and accelerate price increases. Towards the end of January, the situation stabilized somewhat: after peak cold periods, prices retreated to around €35 per MWh. Analysts note that the European gas market has become volatile again, although panic-driven spikes akin to those in 2022 have not yet materialized.
- Low Inventories: By the end of January 2026, EU UGS was filled to only about 45% of capacity—this is the lowest figure for this time of year since 2022. If gas withdrawals continue at the current rate, inventories could drop to ~30% or lower by the end of winter. This means that Europe will need to inject around 60 billion cubic meters of gas over the summer to reach the target level of 90% storage capacity by November 1 (a target established by the European Union for energy security).
- Role of LNG: The primary resource for replenishing inventories remains LNG imports. In 2025, Europe increased its LNG purchases by approximately 30%, to a record ~175 billion cubic meters, effectively compensating for the cessation of pipeline supplies from Russia. In 2026, LNG import volumes are set to continue to grow: the IEA forecasts a ~7% increase in global LNG production to new historical highs. New export facilities are coming online in North America (the US, Canada, Mexico), and by 2025-2030, a total of up to 300 billion cubic meters of new LNG terminals are expected to be commissioned worldwide (around +50% of the current market volume). This partially offsets declining Russian gas volumes.
- Phase-Out of Russian Gas: The EU has officially committed to completely phase out gas from Russia by 2027. By early 2026, Russia's share in European imports had decreased to around 13% (down from 40-45% before 2022). In 2025-2026, sanctions are tightening, leading to further reductions in gas supply in Europe by tens of billions of cubic meters. The resulting deficit is planned to be covered by increased LNG supplies from the US, Qatar, African nations, and other sources. Analysts, however, warn of risks: Europe's dependence on transatlantic LNG has significantly increased—according to IEEFA research, around 57% of LNG imports in the EU in 2025 originated from the US, and this share may reach 75-80% by 2030, which contradicts diversification goals.
- Price Anomalies: Notably, the futures curve in the gas market is currently exhibiting an atypical situation: summer contracts for 2026 are trading higher than winter contracts for 2026/27. This backwardation, contrary to usual seasonal logic, may complicate the economics of gas storage—UGS operators find it unprofitable to purchase relatively expensive summer gas to sell it cheaper in winter. Possible explanations for this phenomenon include market expectations of stable year-round LNG supplies or consideration of regulatory interventions. Nevertheless, such pricing arrangements add uncertainty, and market participants will closely monitor spread dynamics as they plan to fill storage facilities.
Overall, the European gas market is undergoing a stress test amid minimal reserves and a shift in supply sources. Although panic is being avoided thanks to LNG inflows and mild weather periods, price volatility has returned. The upcoming spring and summer will be critical: Europe needs to maximize gas imports and inventories to confidently navigate the next winter without Russian volumes.
Petroleum Products and Refineries: Redistribution of Market Flows
The petroleum product segment is demonstrating mixed trends at the beginning of the year. On the one hand, global demand for petroleum products—especially for jet fuel and diesel—remains high due to the recovery of business activity, tourism, and freight transport. On the other hand, the supply of petroleum products is increasing due to rising crude oil refining in Asia and the Middle East, although trade flows are affected by sanctions and local incidents. The first quarter traditionally marks the beginning of the scheduled maintenance season at refineries worldwide: many refineries are shutting down portions of their capacities for preventive maintenance. As a result, the overall oil refining volume in the first quarter slightly decreases, temporarily reducing demand for crude and exacerbating the oil excess on the market. According to the IEA, widespread refinery maintenance this winter could significantly increase the oil surplus—without additional production constraints, an accumulation of oil and petroleum product inventories at the beginning of the year is inevitable.
Meanwhile, refining margins remain relatively high, particularly for refineries focused on diesel production. At the end of 2025, global refining capacities were operating at record utilization rates. For example, oil refining in China reached an all-time high of about 14.8 million barrels per day on average in 2025 (an increase of +600,000 b/d from 2024) due to the launch of new refineries and China's desire to boost petroleum product exports. South Korea also set a record for diesel fuel exports in 2025—as Asian refiners partially filled the niche that arose after the redistribution of flows from Russia. Sustained high demand for diesel (in the transport and industrial sectors) supports high prices for distillates and ensures substantial profits for large refineries. However, there is some weakness in the gasoline market: oversupply and slowing growth in vehicular traffic have led to a drop in gasoline margins in Asia and Europe to minimal levels over the past year. Nevertheless, the upcoming summer travel season may revive gasoline demand and improve margin conditions in this segment.
The changes in the geography of petroleum product trade under pressure from sanctions deserve separate attention. At the end of 2025, the United States expanded sanctions against the Russian oil and gas sector, including the largest Russian oil companies ("Rosneft," "Lukoil," etc.) in the blacklist. This complicated transactions involving their refined products on the global market. Consequently, at the beginning of 2026, a slowdown in the export of Russian heavy petroleum products (e.g., fuel oil) to Asia was observed. Increasing scrutiny of compliance with sanctions and fear of secondary sanctions have led many Asian buyers to avoid direct purchases of Russian products. According to industry traders, shipments of Russian fuel oil to Asian countries fell for the third consecutive month in January and were approximately half the level of a year ago (about 1.2 million tons versus 2.5 million tons in January 2025). Some unsold volumes are accumulating in tanks and floating storages awaiting resale, and some tankers are taking indirect routes (e.g., around Africa) without disclosing the final destination of the cargo. Trading schemes have become more complex: multi-tiered chains of intermediaries using neutral water transshipments to conceal Russian origins are often employed.
Besides sanctions, military factors are also affecting the reduction of Russian petroleum product exports. In the autumn of 2025, drone strikes on border Russian refineries became more frequent, disabling several installations and decreasing gasoline and diesel production in Russia. Consequently, by early 2026, the supply of Russian fuel oils and other heavy products in the Asian market has contracted, which even provided local support for prices of these fuel types in Asia. However, key markets for Moscow remain Southeast Asian countries, China, and the Middle East—these areas continue to receive the bulk of volumes, as Western sanctions still bar Russian petroleum products from traditional European and North American markets.
On a global scale, the petroleum market is gradually adapting to the new geography. The lion's share of global refining capacity growth in the coming years will occur in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, and Africa—this is where 80-90% of new refineries are being built. This intensifies competition for fuel markets among refiners. Conversely, European refiners are reducing production due to high energy prices and the disappearance of cheap Russian crude. The European Union has completely banned imports of Russian gasoline, diesel, and other products since February 5, 2023, requiring European refineries to pivot towards other grades of oil, often incurring increased costs. By the end of winter 2026, prices for major petroleum products remain relatively stable: diesel fuel maintains high levels due to limited global supply, while gasoline and fuel oil exhibit moderate movements. The conclusion of refinery maintenance in spring may increase product supply; however, much will depend on seasonal demand and the state of the global economy in the second half of the year.
Coal: Record Demand and Regional Differences
Despite all efforts at decarbonization, coal maintained a key role in the global energy landscape in 2025, with global demand reaching historical highs. According to the IEA, coal consumption worldwide in 2025 was about 8.85 billion tons—0.5% more than the previous year. This marks the second consecutive year of record coal use, driven by post-pandemic economic recovery and increased electricity demand. However, analysts believe that the current peak may represent a "plateau" before beginning a gradual decline in coal demand by the end of the decade.
The dynamics of coal usage vary greatly by region:
- Europe: EU countries are accelerating efforts to phase out coal to meet climate goals. A significant event occurred when the Czech Republic completely ceased coal mining on February 1, 2026, closing its last mine after 250 years of operation. Now, Poland remains the only country in Europe with active coal mining. EU power plants are transitioning to gas and renewables, while coal mines close due to being economically unviable and exhausted. The Czech Republic made this move as its power generation is no longer dependent on coal, and the cost of mining exceeded market prices by more than double.
- China: The largest global consumer and producer of coal. In 2025, coal production in China set a record, reaching ~4.83 billion tons. More than half of the country's electricity generation is still supplied by coal-fired power plants. To avoid power shortages, Beijing continues to develop highly efficient coal-fired power plants alongside large-scale renewable energy projects—at least until 2027.
- India: The second-largest coal market combines climate initiatives with rising coal consumption. The government is investing in solar and wind energy while also stimulating production: 32 previously dormant mines were reopened, allowing for increased extraction. The goal is to approach a production rate of ~1.5 billion tons annually, with prospects for even exporting excess coal. Meanwhile, coal helps India reduce energy imports and ensures stable electricity grid operation.
- Japan: About 30% of electricity generation in 2026 will be powered by coal. Despite plans to reduce emissions, authorities consider coal plants essential for system reliability—as reserves in case of interruptions in solar and wind generation, as well as to reduce dependence on expensive imported gas. Coal is firmly embedded in strategy as a strategic reserve, although new renewable and nuclear capacities will gradually reduce its share.
- USA: After a prolonged trend of reducing coal's role in energy, a surprising growth in consumption—approximately 8%—was observed in the USA in 2025. This is attributed to high natural gas prices and increased electricity demand (e.g., from new data centers and energy-intensive manufacturing), making coal generation temporarily more competitive. The US administration has even suspended the decommissioning of several aging coal plants, providing a boost to coal production as part of energy independence efforts.
Thus, coal's role in the global energy balance is now determined by regional characteristics. European economies are actively phasing coal out of their fuel mix for ecological reasons, while many Asian countries—and other regions—still rely on coal for energy security and to keep tariffs stable. The transition to clean energy is uneven: regions rich in renewable potential and capital invest in “green” technologies, whereas states facing rapid demand growth and resource constraints continue to utilize coal-fired capacities to ensure stable electricity supply. It is expected that global coal consumption will soon stabilize and begin to decline gradually as new renewable energy and nuclear power plants come online, but in the short term, coal remains a sought-after fossil fuel.
Electricity and Renewables: The "Green Leap"
The global electricity sector is entering a new phase of accelerated development of renewable technologies. According to the IEA report "Electricity 2026," the world’s generation structure will radically change in this decade. By 2025, electricity generation from renewable sources (solar, wind, etc.) matched generation from coal-fired power plants. Beginning in 2026, clean sources of energy are set to surpass coal in output. Total combined shares of renewables and nuclear energy are expected to reach 50% of global electricity generation by 2030.
The rapid growth is driven primarily by solar and wind power plants. New capacities are added annually: over 600 TWh of generation from solar photovoltaic systems is being added annually. When considering wind as well, the total increase in renewable generation by 2030 is estimated at around 1000 TWh annually (representing +8% per year from current levels). However, electricity demand is also rising rapidly. From 2024 to 2030, global electricity consumption is projected to grow by 3-4% per year—approximately 2.5 times faster than the overall energy consumption growth. This is due to the industrialization of developing countries, the widespread adoption of electric transport (electric vehicles, electric buses), and the digitalization of the economy (expansion of data centers, increased use of air conditioners and home electronics). Consequently, even the rapid growth of renewables does not allow for an immediate displacement of fossil generation: gas-fired generation is increasing to balance systems. Natural gas is viewed by many as a “transition fuel,” and gas generation is expected to increase at least until 2030—albeit at a slower pace than renewables.
The rapid growth of renewable energy is placing new demands on infrastructure. Existing electricity grids and energy storage capacities require significant modernization to integrate intermittent sources (solar and wind). The IEA emphasizes that to meet growing demand and ensure system reliability, annual investments in electric networks need to increase by 50% by 2030 compared to the average level of the past decade. Advances are also needed in energy storage technologies and load management to smooth out peaks and troughs from renewable generation. Many countries are already investing in industrial batteries and "smart grids": for example, excess solar and wind energy in China is planned to be directed towards producing “green” hydrogen, which can then be used as fuel or feedstock in industry. Such projects, along with the development of new battery types (including sodium-ion, reducing dependence on lithium) and hydrogen technologies, are attracting global investor attention.
Energy policy demonstrates differences between regions. In the European Union, the shift towards green energy remains a priority. Despite the energy crisis of 2022, the EU has not rolled back its climate plans; on the contrary, it has accelerated the implementation of renewables. By the end of 2025, electricity generation from wind and solar plants in the EU exceeded fossil fuel generation for the first time. European governments are setting even more ambitious targets: nine countries (Germany, France, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, and others) have agreed on extensive collaboration in the North Sea to develop offshore wind energy. The goal is to reach established capacities of 300 GW in offshore wind farms by 2050 (up from ~30 GW today). By 2030, it is planned to provide at least 100 GW of offshore wind through cross-border projects. This scale of renewable expansion is expected to ensure stable and affordable energy supply, create thousands of jobs, and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.
However, the European green agenda faces challenges as well. Rising interest rates and increasing material costs in 2024-2025 led some tenders for wind farm construction to receive no bids, as investors found the proposed conditions unprofitable. In Germany and the UK, several auctions for offshore wind energy ended without results. EU regulators acknowledge the problem and are preparing support measures: additional guarantees, direct subsidies, and contracts for difference (CfD) mechanisms are under discussion to enhance the attractiveness of renewable projects for businesses.
In contrast to the EU, the US has seen a partial rollback of government support for clean energy following the change in administration in 2025. President Donald Trump’s administration has taken a skeptical view towards various green initiatives. Trump publicly criticized the EU’s renewable approach, calling wind turbines “unprofitable” and claiming, “The more windmills, the more the country loses money.” Consequently, US authorities are focusing on support for traditional energy sources. In addition to measures to revive the coal industry, wind generation projects are now also under scrutiny. In December 2025, the US Department of the Interior unexpectedly suspended several major offshore wind projects, citing new data on potential threats (including presumed interference with military radars). The decision impacted even the nearly completed Vineyard Wind project off the coast of Massachusetts. Major investors—companies such as Avangrid/Iberdrola, Ørsted, and others—have challenged the moratorium in court. By January 2026, they achieved early victories: a federal court temporarily suspended the order, allowing Vineyard Wind to be completed (the facility was over 95% ready). Legal disputes continue, and the industry hopes to avoid serious delays. Nevertheless, the uncertainty has dampened investor interest in American renewable projects, while Europe demonstrates determination to move forward and is ready to enhance support for the sector.
Renewable energy encompasses more than just solar and wind. Many countries are ramping up investments in energy storage infrastructure (industrial batteries), expanding hydropower, and geothermal sources. Concurrently, renewed interest in nuclear energy is occurring as a stable, carbon-free energy source: private companies and funds are investing in developing small modular reactors (SMRs). For instance, the Italian startup Newcleo attracted €75 million in funding in February 2026 to develop compact reactors powered by reprocessed nuclear fuel. Since 2021, Newcleo has raised a total of €645 million and plans to accelerate the construction of an experimental reactor while also entering the US market—one of the most dynamic in the field of advanced nuclear technologies. Such initiatives indicate that the nuclear sector can play a significant role in the decarbonization of the economy alongside renewables.
The impact of the energy transition is already being felt in the markets. In Europe, by the end of 2025, wholesale electricity prices fell significantly compared to autumn—this was supported by mild weather, seasonal demand drops, and high generation from renewables (thanks to windy and warm weather). Nevertheless, reliability problems persist: in particular, Ukraine's energy system is in a severe state due to ongoing attacks on infrastructure, leading to electricity outages during winter. On a global scale, the trend is evident: more than half of all new generating capacities currently coming online globally are derived from solar and wind stations. This instills confidence that while fossil fuels will remain present in the energy balance for a considerable time, the energy transition has taken on an irreversible character—the global energy sector is confidently progressing towards a cleaner and more sustainable model.
Geopolitics and Sanctions: Hopes and Reality
Political factors continue to exert significant influence on global energy resource markets. The sanctioning standoff between the West and key suppliers—Russia, Iran, Venezuela—remains, but market participants are scanning for signs of potential thawing. Some positive signals have indeed emerged in early 2026. Venezuela experienced a political regime change: Nicolás Maduro's ousting opens the way for normalization in the Venezuelan oil sector. Investors are optimistic that with the new leadership, the US will gradually ease sanctions and allow significant volumes of Venezuelan oil to return to global markets (as the country's resources are among the largest in the world). In the long run, this could increase heavy oil supplies and stabilize prices for crude and petroleum products. However, the short-term effect is ambiguous: January's turbulence led to a reduction in Venezuelan exports of approximately 500,000 barrels per day, impacting Asian refineries that process this oil.
The situation surrounding Iran remains tense. Although Tehran has agreed to negotiate with Washington, and initial contacts occurred in Oman, no breakthrough has yet been achieved. The rhetoric from both sides is still hardline, and rumors of potential strikes by the US or Israel on Iranian nuclear sites continue to agitate markets. Iran is a crucial oil producer in OPEC, so any military actions could disrupt export terminals or dissuade shipping companies from operating in the Persian Gulf. Despite the absence of direct confrontation, the likelihood of escalation is embedded in prices via an insurance premium in case of contingencies in the Strait of Hormuz.
Meanwhile, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has now entered its fourth year and continues to affect the energy sector. The European Union has nearly ceased purchasing Russian energy resources, restructuring logistics around alternative suppliers. Russia, in turn, has redirected oil and gas exports to Asian markets and other loyal countries. However, new challenges are mounting in the Russian fuel and energy complex. As noted earlier, the tightening of American sanctions at the end of 2025 complicated even transactions with traditional Asian buyers: many have decided to wait temporarily or demand larger discounts from Moscow due to risk. Additionally, the frequency of drone attacks on Russian infrastructure has increased: aside from strikes on oil refineries, diversions have been recorded on oil depots and pipeline sections. According to industry monitoring, oil output in Russia has started to decline slightly in December 2025 and January 2026 after recovering mid-year. If in the first half of 2025 Russia was able to return to production growth (after declines in 2022-2023), then by early 2026, a decrease has been recorded for the second consecutive month. Experts attribute this to the exhaustion of “easy” redirection paths and difficulties in servicing fields under sanctions. Russian oil export by sea remains high in volume, but is increasingly requiring longer routes and a substantial fleet of "shadow" tankers working around official limitations and risking greater scrutiny in the future.
Thus, geopolitical uncertainty continues to be a significant factor of volatility. Nevertheless, cautious optimism has emerged in markets: many importers have adapted to new conditions, and exporters are demonstrating ingenuity in circumventing barriers. Some experts believe that the most acute phases of the energy standoff are already behind us. However, there is still no substantial progress in diplomatic negotiations—attempts to negotiate easing sanctions or ceasefires have not yielded significant results. Investors continue to closely monitor signals from Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing. Any information regarding potential new negotiations, deals, or easing of the sanction regime can significantly influence market sentiment. Until then, the political factor will continue to introduce an element of uncertainty and turbulence in prices—either due to the risk of sudden conflicts or due to unexpected decisions from regulators and governments.
Investments and Industry Corporate News
Investors in the fuel and energy sector are closely observing both the record profits of traditional oil and gas companies and the substantial investments in energy transition projects. Below are some key corporate events and investment highlights:
- Record Oil and Gas Profits: Major oil and gas corporations concluded 2025 with impressive financial results. For example, ExxonMobil reported a net profit of $28.8 billion for the year, while Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco consistently reported profits of $25–30 billion quarterly (with about $28 billion in the third quarter of 2025 alone). Such colossal earnings allowed companies to boost shareholder returns—initiating large-scale share buyback programs and increasing dividends—as well as reinvesting in new extraction projects. Oil and gas giants are investing in expanding production in traditional sectors: from shale development in the Permian Basin (USA) to deepwater fields off the coast of Brazil and gas projects in East Africa. Simultaneously, many are announcing plans to invest in low-carbon directions (renewables, hydrogen, CO2 capture technologies), although the share of such “green” spending remains small relative to their core businesses.
- Deals in Renewable Energy: Around the world, there is ongoing capital influx into “green” projects, and governments are entering large agreements with investors. For instance, Egypt signed contracts worth $1.8 billion in January 2026 to develop renewable energy. Plans include constructing a 1.7 GW solar power station with a 4 GWh energy storage system in Upper Egypt (a project of the Norwegian company Scatec) and opening a factory by the Chinese firm Sungrow to produce industrial batteries in the Suez economic zone. Aiming to bring the share of green generation to 42% by 2030, Egypt is securing support from international partners. Similar projects demonstrate significant investment activity in developing economies.
- New Technologies and Startups: Innovative companies in the energy sector continue to attract funding. In addition to the aforementioned Italian atomic startup Newcleo, new initiatives in hydrogen and synthetic fuels are emerging. For example, Chilean-American company HIF Global is advancing plans to build a $4 billion plant for manufacturing “green” hydrogen and e-fuels (methanol) at the Port of Açu (Brazil). Recently, it was reported that the project has been optimized, reducing capital expenses: implementation is being divided into batches of < $1 billion each. The first stage is set to be launched by mid-2027 and is expected to generate ~220,000 tons of “electromethanol” annually from hydrogen and captured CO2. Automakers and airlines are showing interest in this new environmentally friendly fuel.
- Mergers and Acquisitions: Consolidation continues in resource sectors. In 2025, two large M&A deals reshaped the oil and gas landscape in the USA: ExxonMobil announced the acquisition of shale producer Pioneer Natural Resources, while Chevron announced the absorption of Hess Corp. This strengthened the positions of oil giants in extraction. In early 2026, possible megadeals were under discussion in related sectors—for example, a merger between mining giants Rio Tinto and Glencore (estimated >$200 billion) aimed at combining coal and metallurgical assets; however, the parties abandoned these plans due to antitrust risks and integration complexities. Major players are seeking to increase scale and synergy, but regulatory barriers may impede the realization of such megaprojects.
- Investment Balance: Overall, investments in the energy sector remain at high levels, with financing for energy transition growing. According to BloombergNEF, in 2025, global investments in clean energy (renewables, electric networks, storage, electric vehicles, etc.) for the first time equaled those in the fossil sector. Banks and funds are reassessing strategies, increasing focus on sustainable financing. However, oil and gas will continue to attract substantial capital for a long time. For investors, the key question is balancing a portfolio between traditional oil and gas (which yields high profits in the short term) and promising “green” directions that may enable future growth. Many are adopting a dual strategy: recording record profits from current high oil/gas prices while simultaneously investing in renewables, hydrogen, and other technologies to not miss out on new growth waves.
Industry corporate news at the beginning of the year also includes the publication of 2025 financial reports, personnel changes, and technological achievements. Riding on the profit wave, some companies announced dividend increases and new share buyback programs, pleasing shareholders. Concurrently, under societal pressure, oil and gas corporations are announcing updated emission reduction goals and investing in climate initiatives, attempting to improve their image and prepare for operations in an energy transition context. Thus, the global energy business demonstrates a commitment to resilience and flexibility: maximizing current profits today while simultaneously laying the groundwork for success in the low-carbon economy of tomorrow.
Expectations and Forecasts
As we approach the end of winter 2026, energy experts are offering cautiously optimistic forecasts. The base scenario for the coming months is the continued relative stability of hydrocarbon prices without sharp fluctuations. States and companies have learned lessons from the upheavals of the early 2020s and have formed mechanisms to respond to crises—from accumulating strategic reserves of oil and gas to coordinated agreements within OPEC+ and energy efficiency programs. Projections from relevant agencies suggest a gradual decline in oil prices towards the end of the year if the surplus supply is realized as planned. For instance, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) anticipates that the average price of Brent could drop to ~$55 per barrel by the fourth quarter of 2026. However, any serious force majeure—escalation of conflict in the Middle East, hurricanes disrupting LNG plants, or other disruptions—could temporarily reverse the price trend upwards.
Regarding the gas market, its further development largely depends on the trajectory of the summer season. If the summer of 2026 is moderately warm and the global LNG industry continues to ramp up exports at a leading pace, Europe should be able to easily fill its storages. In this case, average gas prices in the EU could remain in the range of €25–30 per MWh, comparable to the relatively comfortable levels at the end of 2025. Nonetheless, risks remain: intensified competition with Asia for additional LNG volumes, as well as weather surprises (for example, the risk of droughts lowering hydropower generation or early cold spells in autumn) add uncertainty. If by autumn, gas stocks are replenished close to target levels of 90%, Europe will enter next winter with much more confidence than in the previous year, possessing a solid buffer of resilience.
