The global press appears to have adopted a new form of geopolitical responsibility: declaring wars at the precise moment politicians start fastening their ties. The situation involving Venezuela and the United States serves as a classic example of this media spectacle. Headlines screamed of an imminent invasion and an "oil war"; however, what we're witnessing is a meticulously staged act of political pressure, embellished with deck aviation and convoys of tankers. The war that was so fervently announced across social media and news outlets never materialized. Instead of a full-scale operation, we find ourselves in the middle of a "escort thriller" in the Caribbean. It's hardly surprising: brandishing weapons today is indeed more convenient than sitting in trenches, especially when markets—including oil—have long since learned to distinguish noise from genuine threats.
Geopolitical tension surged against the backdrop of statements regarding a potential "complete and total blockade" of Venezuela, as promised by Donald Trump. The U.S. President did not hold back in his remarks, stating that Washington intends to reclaim rights to Venezuelan oil that were "illegally seized" by local authorities during nationalization.
In light of these declarations, tangible "hawks" appeared in the skies over the Caribbean: U.S. deck aviation was demonstratively mobilized. Data from Flightradar24 recorded fighters F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, two electronic warfare aircraft Boeing EA-18G Growler, and the airborne early warning platform E-2D Advanced Hawkeye actively operating in the airspace. This assortment of equipment, which could be portrayed as readiness to strike, is in reality a standard demonstration of power within the framework of "pressure diplomacy."
Caracas responded in a symmetrical and practical manner by playing its own card: military escort.
Western media reported that tankers transporting oil by-products (carbamide, petroleum coke) from José port set sail towards Asia under the protection of Venezuelan Navy vessels. The state-owned company PDVSA hastened to assure that its vessels are entirely safe and exercising their legitimate right to free navigation.
Apocalypse enthusiasts were left disappointed: Trump addressed the nation, criticized the previous administration, praised himself, and did not declare war on Venezuela. Instead of an invasion, there was a pause; instead of operations, rhetoric about "restoring justice" and reclaiming "stolen" assets echoed memories of the nationalization initiated under Hugo Chávez.
Importantly, support within the U.S. for a forceful approach is minimal. A Quinnipiac University poll indicated that two-thirds of Americans (63%) oppose an invasion of Venezuela, thereby reducing the political risks for the White House. Politically brandishing weapons is a safe endeavor, while engaging in trench warfare is highly disadvantageous. This entire geopolitical drama would make sense if Venezuela still maintained its status as a major supplier. Yet the numbers tell a different story, which is why the oil market has not succumbed to panic.
"No serious shocks to the oil market are expected since Venezuela has reduced its oil production by more than three times over the past two decades—from 3.1 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2004 to 910,000 bpd in 2024," said Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of Open Oil Market, to Vgudok. "For comparison, global oil and gas condensate production is set to reach 82.8 million barrels per day in 2024 (excluding light hydrocarbons).
Venezuela has lost its status as the largest oil producer in South America; Brazil now holds that title, while Guyana and Argentina are actively ramping up production... Therefore, sharp spikes in oil prices are unlikely: in the coming weeks, Brent prices are expected to hover around $60 per barrel, and next year they may drop to $55 per barrel."
Consequently, Venezuela's share now amounts to only about 1% of global supplies. This diminishes the short-term impact on prices to a minimum.
Independent expert Kirill Rodionov agrees, emphasizing that any price impact will be short-lived and weak:
"If there is any effect on prices, it will last for 1-2 days, with fluctuations not exceeding $1-2 per barrel. For the market as a whole, this is not a significant story."
However, the fact that global prices remain stable does not mean that the tensions come without cost.
The geopolitical game translates into direct costs for logistics and insurance. The presence of deck aviation and the threat of blockade compel shipowners to avoid risky routes, raise freight rates, and most importantly, increase insurance premiums. This "oil war" does not hit market prices, but rather pinches the margins of Venezuelan exporters and the logistics costs for buyers.
The current crisis is not about collapse; it's about prospects. Experts agree that the display of strength could serve as a prologue toward the long-awaited and extensive economic transformation of Venezuela.
"I expect that these events will serve as a prologue to Venezuela's complete return to the oil market. Let me remind you that oil production in the country currently stands at less than one million barrels per day, whereas in the mid-2000s production exceeded three million barrels," Rodionov continues. "Caracas will gradually boost oil production, likely due to the demunicipalization of PDVSA, leading to the creation of several independent companies into which American firms will invest... I am confident that within the next ten years, Venezuela could become another significant source of oil production growth and return to mid-2000s production levels."
The rationale behind such a step lies in the catastrophic state of the industry. Experts draw a historical analogy, suggesting that the collapse of Venezuela's oil sector is currently even more severe than what the Soviet Union experienced in the late 1980s. At that time, the Russian government had to resort to borrowing from the World Bank in 1992 for oil production rehabilitation. This is roughly the state in which Venezuela's oil industry finds itself today.
"This can all be fairly easily 'treated,' including through the reduction of tax burdens, lifting sanctions, and privatization of the industry. You simply privatize the oil sector, demopolize it, and invite the best oil service companies, who can rapidly restore oil production. And so there are changes in the country that have long been overdue," says Rodionov.
For Russian oil exports, the short-term threat is minimal—Venezuela's volumes are insignificant, and logistics issues can be compensated within a few weeks.
However, if the restoration plan succeeds, and Venezuela returns to a production level of three million barrels per day within the next 5–10 years, this will enhance competition.
The emergence of an additional one to two million barrels of oil, similar to Russian grades, could complicate the position of domestic exporters in Asian markets. Russia will need to factor in this new element in its sales strategies and pricing.
Trump enjoys playing the role of peacemaker. The losses incurred by American companies date back to nearly two decades ago. The Venezuelan oil industry was officially nationalized for the first time on January 1, 1976. All foreign oil companies conducting business in the country were replaced by Venezuelan ones.
The state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) was established and still exists today. In 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez conducted a second wave of nationalization. This time, not only local businesses but also the branches of Western oil companies—American Exxon Mobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips, British BP, French Total, and Norwegian Statoil—were affected. Chávez's decision incited outrage in the U.S. and other Western nations, which responded by imposing the first harsh sanctions against Venezuela, ultimately leading to the production crisis.
Furthermore, it can be presumed that Maduro's army and navy possess a solid arsenal of Russian-made anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and it's unlikely that the U.S. President would care to experiment with South American "companieros" mastering usage of such arsenals.
For now, this appears to be more of a geopolitical spectacle, carefully staged for a media series rather than a real oil war. Tanker escorts and deck aviation are serious gestures but, without societal support and a willingness for direct invasion, they remain elements of bargaining. Meanwhile, the market counts barrels, not words, eagerly awaiting a shift from noise to actual privatization. The war that journalists love to declare may, in reality, serve as a possible prologue to a new phase of development in the oil industry.
Source: Vgudok
